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BENCH AND BAR
DISTRICT COURT DIGEST
ESTATE TAX-DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
APPLIED TO REALTY UNDER CONTRACT FOR SALE. - In
Re Ryan's Estate, District Court of the First Judicial District,
Grand Forks County, North Dakota, 0. B. Burtness, District Judge.
The decedent owned a large amount of land in North Dakota.
Prior to his death he contracted to sell the property to his sons for
$216,000. The vendees entered into possession of the land, taking
the rents and profits therefrom, pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract for sale. In 1953 the decedent died while a resident of Min-
nesota. A total of $176,000, represented by unpaid promissory
notes, remained due on the contract for the sale of the land.
The promissory notes were listed as part of the decedent's gross
estate in the Minnesota probate proceedings which followed his
decease, and an estate tax on them was paid to the State of Min-
nesota. Ancillary probate proceedings were then commenced in
Grand Forks County, North Dakota. The, State Tax Commissioner
of North Dakota contended that the unpaid balance of $176,000
owed to the decedent at the time of his death was subject to the
estate tax of North Dakota.
Judge Burtness ruled that on the execution of the contract for
deed an equitable conversion occurred, and that the vendor retain-
ed only the naked legal title to the real estate as security for the
payment of the purchase price, occupying substantially the position
of a mortgagee. Thompson Yards v. Bunde, 50 N.D. 408, 196 N.W.
312 (1923); Johnston Land Co. v. Whipple, 60 N.D. 334, 234 N.W.
59 (1930); The Henry S. Grinde Corp. v. Klindworth, 77 N.D. 597,
44 N.W.2d 417 (1950); Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538 (N.D.
1953); Ciapp v. Tower, 11 N.D. 556, 93 N.W. 862 (1902). The
Court further held that in substance the interest retained by the
vendor was a chose in action and a species of personal property
rather than realty. This was made plain by the fact that promissory
notes for the amount of the debt had been executed by the vendees,
although in the Court's view the notes did not "add to the rights of
the vendor which he already had under the terms of the contract
except as further indication of the intent and legal effect of the
contract."
While it has been held that where the vendor retains possession
of real property his interest in it remains taxable as realty despite
execution of a contract for deed, In re Pauls Estate, 303 Pa. 330,
1959]
NoRn DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
154 Atl. 503 (1931), the Court found several authorities holding
that where possession was surrendered to the vendee the interest
retained by the vendor constituted personal property for estate tax
purposes. Dodge County v. Burns, 89 Neb. 534, 131 N.W. 922
(1911); In re Eilerman's Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P.2d 763 (1934).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington had held that where
a vendor owned land outside the State of Washington, an estate
tax could be imposed by the State of Washington upon his interest
in the land when he died domiciled in Washington. This was on
the theory the vendor's interest was personal property and hence
taxable by the state of his domicil. In re Plasterers Estate, 49
Wash.2d 339, 301 P.2d 539 (1956).
The Montana Supreme Court ruled in 1957, in a similar case,
that the vendor's interest in Montana land subject to a contract for
deed was not subject to an inheritance tax levied by the State of
Montana where the vendor had become domiciled in California
prior to death. In re Briebach's Estate, 132 Mont. 437, 318 P.2d
223 (1957). In view of these authorities, and the early adop-
tion by this state of the doctrine of equitable conversion, the
Court concluded that the decedent's interest in the land involved
in the instant case was intangible personal property not subject to
the North Dakota estate tax. While N.D. Rev. Code § 57-3703
(1943) provides that the value of the gross estate of a nonresident
decedent shall be determined by including "all real property locat-
ed within this state," "all tangible personal property having an
actual situs in this state," and the decedent's "equitable interest in
real estate within this state," the interest of the decedent fell within
none of these statutory categories.
DIGEST OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
COUNTIES- IMPLEMENTATION OF GROUP INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR
COUNTY OFFICIALS AND COUNTY EMPLOYEES
July 20, 1959
"The county commissioners are authorized and empowered to de-
termine the wages and salaries of its employees and being that a
group insurance program is in effect an increase of wages or salary
for the employees it would come within the authority granted to
county commissioners."
"However, because of the statute regulating the salary and wages
[VOL. 35
